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RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF GENERAL CRED-
ITORS OF MORTGAGED RAILWAYS
American railways, like English lands, are generally under
mortgage, and they carry encumbrances amounting to billions of
dollars. As quasi public corporations, they are under peculiar
public obligations, and subject, therefore, to public regulation.
Millions of people entrust their goods and persons to them for
transportation, and multiplied thousands give them credit for
millions of dollars annually in current dealing-almost of neces-
sity. And when it is remembered that the directors and managers
of these mortgaged arteries of commerce have the power for
speculative purposes to precipitate foreclosure,' as well as that
receiverships often follow naturally in the wake of misfortune,
it is a subject of general concern, whether against an unwilling
or hostile manager, receiver, trustee or bondholder, those, who
have given the company credit, and parted with their property
or rendered service on faith of its business as a going concern,
and for the benefit alike of mortgagor and mortgagee, have any
substantial security for their just claims.2
The question is also of practical interest to connecting carriers
with traffic balances, and persons injured by the culpable negli-
gence of the company.
(A)-GENERAL FEATURES OF MODERN RAILWAY MORTGAGES.
A preliminary statement of the leading provisions of modern
railway mortgages will facilitate an understanding of the cases
pertinent to the present inquiry. The usual form is a conveyance
by deed of trust, in the most comprehensive terms, of all fran-
chises and property of the company, including rights-of-way,
roadbeds and superstructures, depots, machine shops and station
houses, rolling stock and equipments, and moneys and credits-
in a word, all property, real, personal and mixed--owned or to
be acquired. The deed rarely contains specific descriptions of
the property conveyed, other than an enumeration of its general
classes. The mortgage period usually covers several decades.
I Failure to pay interest for three or six months usually brings to im-
mediate maturity the entire principal.2 Lurton, J.. in Fragin v. Railway Co., 88 Tenn., 165.
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By express provision or plain implication, the mortgagor is per-
mitted to retain possession of the property conveyed until default
shall have been made in the payment of interest or principal of
the mortgage-bonds; upon such default the mortgagee is au-
thorized to enter and take possession of the railways conveyed,
including all rolling stock, equipments and earnings, or to apply
to a court for a receiver.
Since the mortgagor remains in possession, he must operate the
road; otherwise, its value would be greatly impaired and its
franchises lost through forfeiture to the State. Operation neces-
sitates expense; expense requires payment; and, notwithstanding
its conveyance of all moneys, possessed or to be acquired, the
mortgagor is permitted to pay current expenses out of current
income. Rolling stock becomes worn out and is broken, and the
mortgagor is empowered to purchase other cars and engines in
renewal or addition. Increasing traffic requires additional equip-
ment and often necessitates the addition or extension of tracks;
and the mortgagor is permitted to use earnings for these pur-
poses. Without further llustration, the general rule is that,
notwithstanding the mortgage purports to assign "all moneys,
tolls, incomes, rents and profits," the mortgagor may use its
earnings, in his own discretion, for payment of operating ex-
penses, for ordinary and extraordinary repairs of rolling stock
and equipments, for maintenance and extension of roadbeds and
tracks, and for the purchase of such realty and personalty as he
deems necessary and convenient for the conduct of its business.
In apparent violation of the provisions of the mortgage, but in
keeping with its spirit and purpose and uniform usage under
such contracts, the mortgagor may divide the earnings from all
connection with the mortgage-security by using them to pay
dividends upon its stock, or for any purpose he pleases; and as
long as interest is paid upon the mortgage debt, the mortgagee
has no cause for complaint.3 Thus it is seen that a railroad
mortgage differs from most others; first, in that it contains no
specific description and enumeration of the property assigned;
second, in that property subsequently acquired by the mortgagor
will enure to the benefit of the mortgagee; and, third, that the
mortgagor is permitted to exercise over a part of the property
conveyed all the rights and powers of an absolute owner.
3 Cowdrey v. Galveston R. R. Co., ix Wall., 459; Fosdick v. Schall, 99
U. S., 235, and cases cited; and vide post (B), I., 3.
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It is unnecessary to remind the reader that the usual rule is
that the property constituting the mortgage-security must be
described with reasonable certainty; and that a sale or mortgage
of property to be afterwards acquired is merely an executory
contract, for the breach of which the law gives only an action
for damages, and which equity will specifically enforce only for
special reasons presented by the particular case.4 And it is clear
that permitting the mortgagor to exercise the powers left with
the railroad company in possession would render most other
mortgages fraudulent and void.5 For reasons of public exigency
and policy, these rules are waived by courts of equity in favor of
railroad companies, and they are permitted to mortgage their
"entire undertaking." The chief difference between railroad
mortgages and other mortgages is based upon the fact that other
mortgages merely hypothecate certain specific articles, which re-
main constant in kind and quality, while a railroad mortgage is
the pledge of a venture, the assignment of "a going concern"-a
changing and growing security. Roadbed and superstructure.
realty and fixtures, rolling stock and equipments, income and
earnings, are not regarded merely as so much land, so many chat-
tels and such sums of money, but as parts of an entirety, the un-
dertaking or venture, which constitutes the real security-just as a
bottomry bond is a mortgage of the ship and voyage, not merely
of so many planks and beams, masts and sails, money in the ship's
purse and freights to be earned. This difference between railroad
and other mortgages will afford a key to the easy solution of many
questions, which otherwise seem difficult. Property subsequently
4 See Phelps v. Murray, 2 Tenn., Ch. 746, wherein the entire subject is
discussed by Chancellor Cooper with his usual fullness of learning and
all the authorities are reviewed.
G Phelps v. Murray, supra; Tenn. Nat'l. Bk. v. Ebbert, 9 Heisk., 153;
McCrossley v. Hasslock, 4 Bax., I; Bank of Rome v. Hazelton, 15 B. J.
Lea, 216; Robinson V. Elliott, 22 Wall., 513.
6Burnharn v. Bowen, III U. S. 776. This is well expressed by Lord
Cairns: "The undertaking is made the subject of a mortgage in this
sense, that it is made over as a thing complete, or to be completed, as a
going concern,-as a fruit-bearing tree, the produce of which is the fund
dedicated by the contract to secure and to pay the debt. This living and
going concern must not be broken up, or destroyed. Garner v. London,
Chatham & Dover R. R. Co., 36 L. J., Ch. 323. This apt description is
more applicable to American mortgages, which cover all the property and
earnings of the railway, than English debentures, which cover only the
earnings.
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acquired by the company passes to the mortgagee, not merely by
virtue of the mortgagor's contract, for in that case there would
be no difference in the mortgagee's relation to after-acquired
realty, rolling stock and earnings-but because such after-ac-
quired property becomes, and only in so far as it becomes, a
portion of the undertaking-a part of the venture.
7
(B)-RIGHTs BEFORE RECEIVER APPOINTED.
i. Rolling Stock and Equipments-Engines and cars, machin-
ery and tools, and material and supplies are necessary parts of a
railway. Operation is impossible without them; traffic could not
be conducted; fares and freight could not be earned; and fran-
chises could not be preserved. They are inseparable parts of the
"going concern" and indispensable adjuncts of the venture.
Therefore, as soon as acquired they pass under the mortgage
and attach to the security.8 The mortgagee's right to them is
even superior to the claim of the company's vendor for the pur-
7By this it is not necessarily meant that after-acquired property will
pass under a mortgage which merely conveys the undertaking, though
this is the view taken in many cases: Dinsmore v. Racine & Miss. R. R.
Co., 12 Wis., 649, 656; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Commercial Bank,
II Wis., 207, 212; Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B. Mon., 431; Ludlow v. Hurd,
i Dis. (Ohio), 552; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H., 484; and seems to have
the approval of Judge Redfield; 2 Redf., Railways, 5oi, N., 26. Whether
or not these cases are sound, certainly, a mortgage of all property, in-
cluding earnings, owned or to be acquired, is in the strictest sense a
mortgage of the undertaking. See Central Trust Co. v. Chattanooga,
etc., R. Co., 94 Fed., 275.
8 By some courts it is held that rolling stock passes to the mortgagee
as accessions to the realty, upon the principle of accretion: Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Joseph & Denver City Ry. Co., 3 Dill., 412;
Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall., 6o9; Palmer v. Forbes, 23 Ill.,
301, 302; Hunt v. Bullock, 23 Ill., 320; Titus v. Mabee, 25 Ill., 257; Titus
v. Ginheimer, 27 Ill., 462; Gue v. Tidewater Canal Co., 24 How., 257;
Youngmann v. Elmira & Williamsport R. R. Co., 65 Pa. St., 278; Sham-
okin Valley R. R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St., 465; Susquehanna Canal
Co. v. Bonham, 9 Watts, 27; Macon & Western R. R. Co. v. Parker,
9 Ga., 377; Williamson v. N. J. Southern R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq.,
31r. Other cases regard rolling stock, not as accessions to the
realty, but as personalty, which passes under the mortgage as after-ac-
quired chattels. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb.,
484; Stevens v. Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co., 31 Barb., 590; Beardsley v.
Ontario Bk., 31 Barb., 61g; Randall v. Elwell, 52 N. Y., 521; Coe v. C. P.
& L R. R. Co., io Ohio St., 372; Boston, Concord & Montreal R. R. Co.
v. Gilmore, 37 N. H., 410.
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chase priceY The general creditor cannot subject them to the
payment of his debt, because they are necessary parts of the
undertaking, which was mortgaged before his debt was cre-
ated ;o and if the general creditor seeks to levy upon or attach
them, equity, at the suit of the mortgagee, will preserve by in-
junction the indispensable means of continuing the operation of
the road. 1 If, however, the company purchases rolling stock to
an amount in plain excess of the requirements of the road, the
excess becomes subject to levy by the general creditor." Coal,
wood and oil are parts of the undertaking, since engines cannot
be run without fuel, and cannot be subjected to the satisfaction
of a floating debt." So are tools, apparatus and materials, for
railroads cannot be operated without repairs.' 4 Safes, chairs,
desks, stationery and other office furniture, suitable in kind and
of a necessary amount, are necessary to the operati6n of the road
and not subject to levy at the suit of a general creditor.'5 The
mortgage attaches to rails, purchased for the purpose of repair-
ing or extending the track, as soon as purchased, and the mort-
gagee may restrain by injunction the company from selling or
pledging them.'6 Cast-off articles, such as broken wheels, rails
and ties, once forming a part of the road or used in its operation,
remain subject to the lien of the mortgage, if a proper manage-
mient of the road require that they should be repaired, recast or
exchanged for new articles.17 And the mortgage will cover a
majority of the stock of a connecting road, purchased to secure
a consolidation, such acquisition not differing in principle from
an extension of the line of the mortgagor.'8
There are many cases which place the rights of the mortgagee
to subsequently acquired chattels alone upon the express terms
of the mortgage. But such holdings are opposed to the well-
settled rule that nO contract can at law pass an interest in sub-
92 Redf., Railways, 507.
10 Shaw v. Bill, 95 U. S., io; Pennock v. Coe, 23 How., 131.
"Butler v. Rahm, 46 Md., 541.
12Ludlow v. Hurd, i Dis., 552.
Cas., No. 4,449.
"-Phillips v. Winslow, 18 *B. Mon., 43, 44; Dunham v. Earl, 8 Fed.
14 Phillips v. Winslow, supra.
15 Ludlow v. Hurd, supra.
18 Weejen v. St. P. & Pacific R. R. Co., 4 Hun (N. Y.), 529.
'7 Cooper iv. Wolf, i5 Ohio St., 523; Buck v. Seymour, 46 Conn., 156.
1s Williamson v. N. I. Southern R. R. Co., 26 N. J. Eq., 398.
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sequently acquired chattels and that equity will enforce agree-
ments for the sale or mortgage of chattels acquired after the
contract only in particular cases and for special reasons. The
cause of the exception in favor of railway mortgages is that
public policy favors the construction and operation of railways;
and, therefore, permits the company, as a means of securing
credit for the cost of construction and equipment, to mortgage
the entire undertaking, with all its aids and incidents. But the
very reason of the exception suggests its proper limitation to
such chattels as, by fair application of a liberal rule, may be con-
sidered as helps in maintaining the road as "a going concern."
2. Realty and Structures.--All lands used for road-beds, sta-
tion-houses, depots, machine shops and other necessary or con-
venient structures, or acquired for such purposes, are parts of the
railroad, "the undertaking made over. as a thing complete, or
to be completed.""' So new lines acquired by construction, 20 ex-
tension,21 lease,22 or purchase,' 3 pass at once tinder the mortgage.
But woodland, lying off the line of road, though purchased as a
source of fuel, does not pass to the mortgagee and is subject to
levy by a general creditor. 24  And town lots having no connec-
tion with the road and its operation, cannot be claimed by the
mortgagee and can be taken to satisfy a floating debt.
2 5 Nor can
the mortgagee claim lands bought by the company when securing
its right of way "to avoid dissevering a tenement," though the
purchase price was a part of the fund advanced by the mort-
gageeY Nor does the mortgagee take a "land gfant" subse-
quently acquired by the mortgagor, when the mortgagor had no
charter power to acquire such a grant at the date of the execu-
tion of the mortgage.' 7  It is otherwise where the land was
granted as an inducement to the construction of the road, for
in such case the land grant is the very trunk of "the fruit-bearing
19 Hamlin v. European, etc., R. Co., 72 Me., 83; Boston, etc., R. Co. v.
Coffin, 50 Conn., 15o; Shaw v. Bill, 95 U. S., io.
20 Galveston R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, ii Wall., 459.
21 Dunham v. Cincinnati, Penn. & Chicago R. R. Co., I Wall., 254.
22Barard v. Norwich & Worcester R. R. Co., 3 Cent. L. J., 6o8.
23 Williamson v. N. . Southern R. R. Co., 26 N. J. Eq., 398.
24 Dinsmore v. Racine & Miss. R. R. Co., x2 Wis., 649.
2..Shamokin Valley R. R. Co. v. Livermore, 47 Pa. St., 465; Calhoun
v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 4 Fed. Cas., No. 2,309.
26 Gardner v London, Chatham & Dover R. Co., 36 L. J. Ch. 323.
27 Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala., 237.
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tree."2 s The general rule, which, because, of the special form of
particular mortgages, may not always apply, is that lands ac-
quired by the company for any other than railway purposes will
not pass under the mortgage."
3. Tolls and Income.-The right of a general creditor of a
railroad company in possession to impound the earnings of a
mortgaged railway has been the subject of widely divergent
opinions, but is now settled by the great preponderance of best
authority, including the Supreme Court of the United States.
(a) There is a class of cases represented by Buck v. Memphis
& Little Rock Railroad Gompany ° and Pullan v. Cincinnati &
Chicago Air Line Railroad Company,31 in which it is held that
the mortgage attaches to the tolls and income as soon as earned
and that the general creditor can acquire no right to or lien upon
them. Such cases place earnings upon the same footing as roll-
ing stock, ignoring the distinction that income when earned
ceases to have any necessary connection with the operation of
the road, and that the company, before the appointment of a
receiver, has the right to use its income as it chooses. These
cases would not now be followed anywhere, except possibly in
Iowa, whose court seems wedded to its iniquity.32
(b) Another class of decisions is to the effect that the mort-
gage attaches to the income as soon as the amount of net earn-
ings, after the payment of operating expenses is ascertained.
Parkhurst v. North Carolina Railroad Company and Clay v.
E. T. V. & G. R. R. Co.34 will serve for illustration. These
cases, while properly taking into account the fact that the mort-
gagor in possession must pay current expenses out of current in-
come, overlook the further fact that the mortgagor before de-
fault can use income, both gross and surplus, as it chooses,
and that retention of net income is not necessary to a continu-
ance of the undertaking. Moreover, the rule is open to the prac-
tical .objection that a railroad company has at all times a large
28 Campbell v. Texas & N. 0. R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 263.
209 Seymour v. Canandaigua & Niagara Falls Railway, 25 Barb., 284;
Pardee v. Aldridge, 189 U. S., 429.
304 Cent. Law Journal, 430.
'5 Biss., 287.
2"Jessup v. Bridge Co., ii Iowa, 572; Dunham v. Isselt, i5 Iowa, 284.
33 T9 Md.. 472.
3 6 Heisk.. 421. See, also, Spies v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 40 Fed. Rep.,
34.
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amount of contingent liabilities and that the exact amount of net
earnings can at no time be definitely ascertained.
(c) The true rule has been well expressed by judge Swayne :'
"Possession draws after it the right to receive and apply the in-
come. Without this, the road could not be operated and no
profits could be made. Mere possession would have been useless
to all concerned. The right to apply enough of the income to
operate the road will not be questioned. The amount to be so
applied was within the discretion of the company. The same
discretion extends to the surplus. It was for the company to
decide what should be done with it. In this condition of things
the whole fund belonged to the company and was subject to its
control. It was, therefore, liable to the creditors of the com-
pany as if the mortgage did not exist. They were in no wise
affected by it."
This ruling has been repeatedly followed in that court in later
cases30 and, being the settled opinion of our highest tribunal,
should conclude the question, even if it were not supported by
the best considered decisions of other courts.
3
If a specific sum is set apart as interest or sinking fund of the
mortgage bonds, it has been held that it thereby ceases to be sub-
ject to the claim of a general creditor ;"' and it seems, upon prin-
ciple, that this would be such an appropriation of particular
chattels to the executory contract as would execute it and pass
property. But, it has been held, even when the treasurer turned
over money to the mortgagee upon possession taken by him after
default that the general creditor might follow the fund in the
hands of the mortgagee and subject it to the payment of his
debt."0
From a review of the decisions it will appear that, while there
have been wide differences of opinion between the courts and
' Gilnan v. Illinois & Miss. Telegraph Co.. 91 U. S., 6o3.
30 Galveston R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, i Wall., 459; American Bridge Co.
v. Heidelbach, 94 U. S., 798; Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S., 235, and cases
cited: Burnham v. Bowen, II1 U. S., 776; Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville,
etc., R. Co., 174 U. S., 674.
37 Smith v. Eastern R. R. Co., 124 Mass., 154; Ellis v. Boston, Hartford
& Erie R. R. Co., l07 Mass., i; Bath v. Miller, 53 Me., 308; Noyes v.
Rich, 52 Me., 115; Merchants' Bank v. Petersburg R. R., 34 Leg. Int.,
24o; Miss. Valley R. R. Co. v. U. S. Express Co., 81 Ill., 534.
38 Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co. z. Menzies, 26 IIl. 12.
39 DeGraff v. St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co., 5 Fed Rep., 561.
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even in the same court in different cases, the relative rights of
bond holders and general creditors of mortgaged railways, before
possession has been taken by the mortgagee or a receiver ap-
pointed at his instance, have been fixed by practical concurrence
of the more authoritative tribunals.
(C)-AFTER THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER.
The questions as to effect of the appointment of a receiver, or
an entry after default by the mortgagee, present more difficulty.
The cases are in irreconcilable conflict. The principles announced
by different courts, and in some instances by the same court in
successive cases, are strangely repugnant. In the space allotted
it is impossible to discuss all the decisions. Merely to cite them
would be of small advantage. Only such will be noticed as will
serve to illustrate the different views upon the subject and to
place the reader who desires to make further inquiry upon the
path of investigation.
The decisions can be grouped into four general classes:
I. Cases Holding the Mortgage Superior to All Floating Debts.
-Dunham v. Cincinnati, Peru and Chicago Railroad Company0
was a contest between a contractor who had built a portion of the
railway and the mortgagee. Notwithstanding the fact that the
railroad company had agreed with the contractor that he should
retain possession of the road built by him until the earnings paid
his claim, the court treated him as a second encumbrancer and
gave the entire proceeds of the road to the prior mortgagee. Mr.
Justice Clifford says: "Registration of the first mortgage was
notice to all the world of the lien of complainant; and, in that
view, the case does not even show a hardship upon the con-
tractor." And Mr. Jones says in beginning his discussion of this
subject: "At the outset it is proper to state as a settled legal
principle that a fixed legal right cannot be impaired by any equities
subsequently arising.4 1 But the author had, for the moment, for-
gotten that the mortgagee has no legal claim whatever to after-
acquired property. Such rights are entirely equitable, deriving
their existence from equitable principles, depending for protec-
tion and enforcement upon equitable remedies, and subject to
equitable restrictions and limitations. And Mr. Justice Clifford,
40 1 Wall., 254.
41 Jones, Railroad Securities, 557.
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in placing his decision upon the naked provision of a registered
contract, fails to note that, while the contractor had notice of a
mortgage which would mature in twenty years, he had no notice
that the railroad company would be deprived of possession almost
immediately. The case illustrates the monstrous injustices which
would follow upon the enforcement of the rule it declares. That
the entire proceeds of property created by the money and labor
of another may be taken, without any compensation whatever, is
a result no one would expect to follow upon the application of
equitable principles. Furthermore, this decision is opposed to the
well-settled rule that, though the mortgage attaches to property
subsequently acquired by the company, it is subject in the hands
of the mortgagee to all the requirements of the contract by
which it was acquired by the mortgagor.
42 And it is in direct con-
flict with the decision in Dunham v. Cincinnati, Peoria & Chicago
Railway.
48
2. Cases Wherein the Court Has Allowed Certain Floating
Claims, the Payment of Which Tended to Preserve the Mortgage-
Security. In Douglass v. Cline,4 4 the court ordered the receiver
to pay balances due to employees of the company at the date of
his appointment, for the reason that withholding payment might
result in discontent and cessation of work by employees and a
consequent suspension of the operation of the road. The court
said: "It was the duty of the chancellor to allay this discontent,
and to assist his receiver in securing the services of these people,
and thus to secure the profitable management and operation of
the road in his hands." The opinion of the majority of the
court places the allowance of such claims upon the ground that
it was necessary to preserve the trust property from injury and
expressly distinguishes such claims from other general or floating
debts of the company. For the same reason the Supreme Court
of the United States ordered the receiver to pay traffic and freight
balances due from the company to other connecting railroads, the
court saying through Mr. Justice Blatchford:
42 Southern Ry. Co. v. Ensign Manuf. Co., 117 Fed. Rep., 417; Galveston
R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, ii Wall., 459; U. S. v. N. 0. R. R. Co., 12 Wall.,
362; Wilbuk v. Norris Canal Co., 3 Green, N. J. Ch. 377; Williamson v.
N. I. Southern R. R. Co., 28 N. J. Eq., 298; S. C., 29 Id., 311; Meyer v.
Johnson, 53 Ala., 352.
43 13 Railway Times.
44 12 Bush., 6o8.
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"The payment of limited amounts due to other and connecting
lines for unpaid ticket and freight balances, and for materials and
repairs, the outcome of indispensable business relations, where
the stoppage of a continuance of such business relations would be
a probable result in case of non-payment, may well place such
payments in the category of payments to preserve the mortgaged
property in a large sense by maintaining the good will and in-
tegrity of the enterprise."4
This rule is indisputably correct as far as it goes, for it is a
general principle that a trustee or receiver may make, and courts
of equity will order made, all expenditures which are necessary
to preserve the subject-matter of the trust or receivership from
injury.46 The objection to the rule is that it is too narrow; it
considers only the rights and interest of the mortgagee. It pays
no regard to the fact that the mortgagor was left in possession,
charged with the duty of operating the road, with power to pay
expenses of operation out of income; and the necessary corollary
of this proposition is that operating expenses constitute prior
charges upon the earnings of the road. And as shown by Judge
Cofer in the dissenting opinion in Douglass %,. Cline, supra, the
rule is too indefinite for practical guidance. "In a large sense,"
every debt contracted by the company, in the legitimate exercise
of the powers left it by the mortgagee, has relation to the preser-
vation of the value of the security, since it aids in the equipment
or forms part of the operation of the road; and payment of all
floating debts may be said to tend to preserve the value and
"integrity of the enterprise," since neither persons nor corpora-
tions can retain the good will of the public without paying their
debts. In practice, however, the courts have undertaken to say.
upon purely arbitrary reasons, that certain payments would, and
others would not tend "to insure the continued value of the en-
terprise." 'These cases cannot be reconciled with each other, nor
with any equitable principle. The rule sought to be 'established
by this class of opinions leaves the relative rights of mortgage
and general creditors to be measured by the "crooked chord of
judicial discretion;" and not by "the golden mete-wand of the
law."
3. Cases Allowing Floating Claims Accruing Within a Certain
Period Before the Receivership.-In Union Trust Co. v. Souther
C Miltenberger v. Logansport & C. R. R. Co., lo6 U. S., 286.
46 2 Perry, on Trusts, Sect. 91o.
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the court ordered the receiver to pay all claims contracted by the
company within six months next before his appointment.17 In
Fosdick v. Schall all floating debts accruing within three months
before the receivership were ordered paid.4 8 And so in Milten-
berger v. Logansport, &c., R. R. Co., payment was ordered of
all debts incurred by the company within ninety days before the
receiver was appointed .4 It is manifest that this is judicial legis-
lation, pure and simple, all the more arbitrary and unjust because
retrospective. It has not even the virtue of certainty, the usual
advantage of arbitraryr rules, since the courts adopt in each case
such period as they please without regard to former practice.
4. Cases Allowuing All Claims Contracted by the Mortgagor as
Parts of the Current Expenses of Operating the Road.-It has
been seen from the foregoing cases that the adjudications do not
present the familiar aspect of the development of a new branch of
law by the gradual growth of a persistent principle; but to the
contrary, the decisions rest upon opposed and contradictory
reasons, thus evincing judicial dissatisfaction with the grounds
of former opinions. It remained for Mr. Chief Justice Waite to
declare a rule, which embraces the entire subject, pays equal re-
gard to the rights of mortgage and general creditors, will bear
criticism and sustain analysis because closely evolved from the
character of the contract, and will uniformly enforce equity, be-
cause it holds the mortgagee to the results which just and
intelligent men would have contemplated in making the agree-
ment. The reasoning by which the true rule was reached can be
thus briefly stated: In permitting the mortgagor to remain in
possession, the mortgagee intended it should operate the road;
operation necessitates expense; power to incur expense carries
with it the power to make payment; current income, though ex-
pressly included in the mortgage, must be used in defraying cur-
rent costs of operation; holding the parties to the necessary
results of their contract, the court will declare current expenses
a prior and paramount charge upon current income; but the op-
eration of a railroad requires at times expenditures in excess and
anticipation of the income; therefore, it is not sufficient that
current income for any period should be applied to current ex-
penses within that period; but, in the view of a court of equity,
47 107 U. S., 591.
4899 U. S., 235.
49 Io6 U. S., 286.
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debts incurred in the operation of the road are a continuing
charge upon the earnings of the road. These propositions estab-
lish the relative rights of the holders of mortgage-bonds or
debentures and general or floating debts of the company; and a
court, when its equitable aid is invoked by the mortgagee, will
avail itself of the flexibility of -equitable forms to adapt the
remedies of the various classes of creditors to the conveniences
afforded by the special facts of the particular case.
Fosdick v. Schall:" was an application by a general creditor for
an order for the payment by the receiver of rental upon cars
leased to the company; and the court, through Mr. Chief Justice
Waite, said:
"Railroad mortgages and the rights of railroad mortgagees are
comparatively new in the history of judicial proceedings. They
are peculiar in their character and affect peculiar interests. * * *
The business of all companies is done to a greater or less extent
on credit. This credit is longer or shorter as the necessities of
the case require: and when the company becomes pecuniarily
embarrassed, it frequently happens that debts for labor, supplies,
equipments and improvements are permitted to accumulate in
order that bonded interest may be paid and a disastrous fore-
closure be postponed, if not altogether avoided. In this way the
daily and monthly earnings, which ordinarily should go to pay
daily and monthly expenses, are kept from those to whom in
equity they belong, and used to pay the mortgage debt. * * *
Every railroad mortgagee in accepting his security impliedly
agrees that the current debts made in the ordinary course of
business shall be paid from the current receipts before he has
any claim upon the income. If for the convenience of the mo-
ment something is taken from what may not improperly be
called the current debt fund, and put into that which belongs to
the mortgage creditors, it is certainly not inequitable for the
court, when asked by the mortgagees to take possession of the
future income and hold it for their benefit, to require that what
is due from the earnings to the current debt shall be paid by
the court from the future current receipts before anything derived
from that source goes to the mortgagees. * * * This, not
because the creditors to whom such debts are due have in law
a lien upon the mortgaged property or income, but because in a
sense the officers of the company are trustees of the earnings for
the benefit of the different classes of creditors and stockholders;
and if they give to one class that which properly belongs to
another, the court may, upon an adjustment of the accounts, so
use the income which comes into its own hands as, if practicable,
50 99 U. S., 235.
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to restore the parties to their original equitable rights. * * *
It follows that if there has been in reality no diversion, there
can be no restoration; and the amount of the restoration should
be made to depend upon the amount of the diversion."
Burnham v. Bowen
5l was an application for payment by the
company's vendor of coal. Mr. Chief Justice Waite again de-
livered the opinion of the court and expressly confirms the hold-
ing in Fosdick v. Schall, saying: "We think the debt was a charge
in equity upon the continuing income as well that which came
into the hands of the court after the receiver was appointed as
that before."
All our courts should follow the established rule of the most
eminent and authoritative of American tribunals. Thus three
propositions, practically embracing all questions which can arise
between mortgagees and general creditors, will be made definite
and certain:
First-Debts, contracted by the mortgagor in possession as a
part of the expense of operating the road, are prior charges
upon the earnings of the road and must be paid before interest
or principal of the mortgage debt;
Second-Such debts are a continuing charge upon the earn-
ings of the road;
Third-The right of the mortgagee to property acquired by the
mortgagor after the mortgage, and to future earnings, becomes
fixed by the appointment of a receiver; and in order to reach the
earnings of the road pending the receivership, by invoking the
equity of marshalling assets, or to subject the corpus of the
mortgage-security to the payment of the floating debt, upon the
principle of following a fund into its investment, the general
creditor must show a diversion, made for the benefit of the
mortgagee, of current earnings from the payment of current
expenses.
What are current expenses of operation, within the meaning of
this rule, has not been judicially defined, except by adjudging
that particular classes of claims fell within the principle. From
the cases above cited and for obvious reasons it seems plain that
debts due for supplies, labor, equipments, repairs and improve-
ments, and as freight and ticket balances are within the rule.
A liability of the company on account of stock killed is a "running
51 I U. S., 776.
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expense." 2 Claims for injuries to persons and property, oc-
curring pending the operation of the road by a receiver, are
ordered paid out of his earnings, upon the theory that such lia-
bilities are necessary incidents of operating a railroad."3 And it
seems that they would, equally and for the same reason, be ele-
ments of the current expenses of operating the road by the
mortgagor. It could hardly be insisted that incurring liability
as damages for injuries to property was not a necessary incident
of operating a railway, in the face of the fact that no road was
ever run without such liabilities, or that the duty to make com-
pensation for personal injuries was not a part of running ex-
pense, because such injuries are not necessary incidents of the
operation of the road, in view of the fact that over ten thousand
persons have been killed or injured in the operation of the rail-
ways of the United States within a single year. 4
The reason of the rule requires that operating expenses shall
include every source of liability usually incident to the opera-
tion of a railway, or in the words of Chief Justice Waite, "all
current debts made in the ordinary course of business." 5
(D)-REMEDIES OF GENERAL CREDITORS.
I. Before Receivership.-If rolling stock is purchased by the
company in plain excess of the requirements of the road, it is
subject to levy at the suit of a general creditor ;50 and so is after-
acquired realty, which has no connection with the operation of
the road.57 If the mortgagee makes unreasonable resistance to the
payment of the general creditor, or inequitably interposes for de-
lay, equity will permit a sale of sufficient rolling stock to satisfy
the demand. s58 Where the distinction prevails as to the mortga-
gee's right to gross and net income, the general creditor's remedy
is a bill for an account.50 A receiver will be appointed to take
possession of and operate the road at the suit of a creditor of the
5'Lane v. Baughman, 17 Ohio St., 642.
: Little v. Dusenberry, 46 N. J. Law, 614; Meara v. Holbrook, 2o Ohio
St., 137; Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt., 255; Cowdrcy v. Galveston, etc., R. R.
Co., 93 U. S., 352; Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass., 395.
54 Compendium of Twelfth Census, Vol. 2, p. 1267.
55 Burnham v. Bowen, supra.
51 Ludlow v. Hurd, supra (B), I., I.
57 Supra (B), I., 2.
5s Pennock v Coe, 23 How., 131.
59 Clay v. E. T. V. & G. R. R. Co., 6 Heisk., 421.
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company; the mortgagee need not be made a party to such a suit;
and in such a case, the mortgagee is not entitled to the earnings
of the receivership. 0 If an execution or attachment can be levied
upon the money of the company, it may be-for money is as
much subject to levy as any other chattel.61 But such levies will be
found to be accompanied with practical difficulties. Garnishment
or trustee process will afford the speediest and most efficacious
remedy.
In this way ticket and freight balances due from other com-
panies and individuals can be reached ;62 but not funds in the
hands of the treasurer or station agents of the company, for
their possession is that of the company, and the execution debtor
cannot be made a garnishee for his own debt.'" Of course, the
entire equitable interest of the company, like that of any other
mortgagor, may be sold for debt; and the purchaser takes the
road and appurtenances ciun onerc.4
2. Pending the Reccivership.--The court in the order appoint-
ing a receiver for a railway should impose such terms for the
payment of the floating debts of the company as, under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, appear to be reasonable; but
if this is not done, and it appears in the progress of the cause
that earnings have been used to pay mortgage debt or to make
improvements, leaving operating expenses unpaid, the court will
order payment out of the earnings of the receiver."
5 The decree
of foreclosure or order of sale should protect the rights of cred-
itors holding claims superior to the mortgage, either by reserving
a sufficient amount from the proceeds of the sale or by providing
that the purchaser take the road cur onere of such claims,
After an order for the receiver to take possession of the road,
its property ceases to be subject to levy of creditors and no
60 Milteubtrger v. Logansport & C. R. R. Co., O6 U. S., 286; American
Bridge Co. v. Heidelbach, 94 U. S., 798.
81 Dalby v. Mullins, 3 Hun., 437; sed. cf., Turner v. Fendall, i Cranch,
I18.
62 Smithv. Eastern R. R. Co., 124 Mass., 154; Ellis v. Boston, H. &
E. R. R. Co., 107 Mass., i; Bath v. Miller, 5, Me., 308; Noyes v. Rich, 52
Me., 115.
63Pettingill v. Androscoggin R. R. Co., 51 Me., 370; Fowler v. P. W.
& C. R. R. Co., 35 Pa. St. 22; Pullan v. C. & C. A. L. R. R. Co., 5 Biss.,
237.
64 Miltenberger v. Logansport & C. R. R. Co., io6 U. S., 286.
63 Fosdick v. Schall, supra; Burnham v. Bowen, supra.
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proceedings can be had against it without permission from the
court appointing the receiver. 6
A general creditor seeking payment of his claim should inter-
vene by petition for examination pro interesse suo in the cause
wherein the receiver was appointed.
7
This paper is based chiefly upon principles of the common law
and doctrines of equity, as applicable in ordinary cases. The
rights and remedies herein supported may be materially varied in
some instances by the special form of particular mortgages, or
local statutory provisions prescribing the effect of railway
mortgages. Henry H. Ingersoll.
Knoxville, Tenn.
66 De Groff v. Jay, 3o Barb., 483; Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves., 335; Boston v.
Barbour, lO4 U. S., 726; Thompson v. Scott, 4 Dill., 5o4.
67 1g Am. La* Review, 42o et seq.
